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I am indebted to David Lewis and Charlie Kolstad for early discussions that convinced me it 
might be useful to pursue such a simple question, and to Elena Irwin for useful comments, though 
all errors in execution are my own. The paper is based in part upon work supported by the 
Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
under Project No. ILLU 05-0305.   2
Research related to the Endangered Species Act (ESA, the Act) tends to take the presence of that 
policy as given and focus on issues of implementation and effects. Some work has worried about 
whether the ESA yields enough perverse outcomes that redesign is necessary to protect species 
(List et al., 2006; Lueck and Michael, 2003; Zhang, 2004). I work in this paper to explore a more 
basic question: is the ESA based on useful conservation objectives?  
The ESA identifies species as the unit of regulatory interest. This approach is problematic 
for several reasons. First, as George and Mayden (2005) point out, there is no single definition of 
“species” even in conservation science, and the Act itself does not provide a good operational 
definition. This lack of clarity has produced much wasteful debate amongst interest groups over 
the concept of species and slowed effective ESA enforcement. Second, even if there were a single 
accepted definition of species, one could construct numerous different “optimal” policies 
depending on one’s beliefs about the relative importance of species characteristics such as those 
identified by Metrick and Weitzman (1998): utility, distinctiveness, survivability and cost. 
Third, the ESA seems formally to require that conservation efforts be spread evenly 
across species to prevent their extinctions regardless of how productive those species are and how 
much people actually care about them. While the administrative process does have a limited 
priority system and does allow some informal variation in how species are treated according to 
how expensive they are to protect and how much people value them (Metrick and Weitzman, 
1996; Ando, 1999), this may provide only limited opportunity for variation in public support to 
be expressed in how much we do to protect different species. Hendrickson’s (2005) media 
analysis finds significant attention is paid in national newspapers to economic conflicts associated 
with the ESA, particularly in the cases of species that are not popular and are viewed as largely 
“obstructionist.” While the ESA as a whole retains general popular support, protection for low-
valued species could undermine aggregate national willingness-to-pay for ESA enforcement. The 
budget for government ESA-related program activities is not fixed by legislation, and thus is 
subject to erosion when net public support for the program is low.   3
 
Indeed, the focus of conservation science has evolved in recent years towards ecosystems and 
away from species; this is discussed in the useful review by Armsworth et al. (2004). The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment captures the change in conservation science with its focus on 
ecosystem services rather than on the exact species that provide them (MEA 2005). Christie et al. 
(2006) evaluate the extent to which people value “biodiversity” for features such as production of 
ecosystem services. Work such as Schwartz et al (2000) has shown that ecosystem services rise 
only asymptotically with measures of biodiversity. Particular species may be critical to producing 
ecosystem services; bees, mangroves, and plankton are extreme examples of this principle (Ewel 
et al., 1998; Memmott et al., 2004; Richardson and Schoeman, 2004.)  Biodiversity itself may 
also contribute to ecosystem-service production. However, society gains value from the services
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and not necessarily from inputs to the production of services. While every species may not have 
intrinsic value to society, people do value some species in their own right, such as bears, pandas, 
tigers, butterflies, and whales. Loomis and White (1996) find that per household willingness to 
pay (WTP) is higher for birds and marine mammals than for less charismatic animals such as fish 
and reptiles, with annual household WTP for a species ranging as high as $96. 
Many conservationists are reluctant to change the ESA, feeling that public support for 
species like wolves, grizzly bears and bald eagles translates into support for conservation efforts 
that provide ecosystem services for which experts fear that the public might be otherwise 
unwilling to pay. However, some work implies there is only limited potential for public 
willingness-to-pay to save charismatic species to serve as an effective instrument for protecting 
other elements of the natural world that are necessary for producing ecosystem services 
(Kontoleon and Swanson, 2003,) and the correlation between areas that harbor biodiversity and 
areas that provide ecosystem services may be weak (Chan et al., 2006). We might well fear that 
adding polar bears to the endangered-species list is an inadequate substitute for rational 
conservation policy.   4
This paper seeks to begin a national discussion about optimal conservation policy. It 
characterizes optimal conservation spending when species are valued for their contributions to 
ecosystem services and not even for their own existence. It explores the manner in which the ESA 
distorts resource targeting away from the optimum. It identifies circumstances under which 
complementary private conservation activity can remedy ESA-related misallocation, and 
identifies the stylized empirical relationship between ESA enforcement and private contributions 
to wildlife conservation groups. It concludes with a broad-ranging discussion of possible U.S. 
conservation policy reform. 
 
Theoretical Model 
Swanson (1994) uses a sophisticated model to analyze optimal species preservation and 
extinction as a function of the benefits that species provide to society. However, that paper does 
not shed light directly on policy-design issues associated with the ESA, and does not analyze a 
situation with joint government and private provision of conservation goods. In this section, I use 
a very simple static theoretical model to explore the nature of optimal conservation efforts for 
different type of species where people benefit from ecosystem services and some – but not all – 
species. I show scenarios under which current policy might distort our conservation resources 
away from that, and illustrate the consequences of such distortion. Then I present a model in 
which conservation is provided by government programs and privately funded NGOs, and 
develop alternative hypotheses about the relationship between these forms of conservation 
support. 
The theoretical model assumes there are two types of species: charismatic species (“B”) 
and non-charismatic species that are not valued for their own sake (“N”). This section of the 
paper considers only the case where both kinds of species are endangered, though other scenarios 
are discussed qualitatively in the conclusion. Species populations are increasing functions of the 
funds made available to conserve them – b and n for charismatic and non-charismatic species,   5
respectively.  
The variables b and n are defined as funds that benefit exclusively one species or another 
to highlight potential problems associated with mis-targeting conservation spending. Note that 
this notion of “funds” is an expositional convenience. This analysis applies to all social resources 
that are devoted to conservation, whether in the form of direct monetary expenditures (like 
captive breeding programs) or opportunity costs (from timber that can not be logged and stream 
flows that can not be used by growing cities). Since they are quantities of money, the prices of 
funds b and n are by definition equal to 1. For simplicity, I model the production of species 
populations as:  
() ()
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These functional forms are simple but can display varied types of returns to scale: 
increasing when γi >1, constant when γi =1, and decreasing when 0 < γi <1. Ecologists and 
conservation biologists have produced many studies that support the idea that species often have 
minimum viable populations below which the species will not persist in the wild (Soulé, 1996). 
Scientists have also found thresholds in the response of species populations to habitat alteration 
(e.g. Guénett and Villard, 2004). In the presence of such thresholds, the functions linking 
conservation funds to species populations are likely to display increasing returns to scale.  
The model also assumes there are two goods provided by conservation activity that 
people value: populations of charismatic species, B, and ecosystem services (“S”) such as flood 
control, nutrient cycling, food production, biodiversity-based ecosystem resilience, and so forth. 
People do not value non-charismatic species in their own right, but they do value the ecosystem 
services that are produced by nature and which depend on both types of species, B and N, as 
inputs to their production.  
Note that endangerment does not preclude the possibility that a species contributes to 
ecosystem services; Lyons et al. (2005) find evidence that rare species can make important   6
contributions to ecosystem functioning. However, many ecosystem services depend largely on 
species that would not qualify for protection under the ESA. Species populations can fall 
significantly, taking the level of ecosystem function with them, before they are even close to the 
dire state of endangerment that is necessary before ESA protection could be invoked. I will not 
model this case explicitly, but it is clear that the feature of the ESA yields under-provision of 
ecosystem services relative to the social optimum. 
I characterize the production model for ecosystem services as Cobb-Douglas, where 
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Again, this function can display varied types of returns to scale depending on the sum  
δb and δn . The Cobb-Douglas function assumes a moderate degree of substitutability between the 
two species in the process of producing ecosystem services; future extensions of this work may 
evaluate the impact on the findings of having more or less substitution possible between these 
inputs. The exact nature of such a production function will necessarily vary with the particular 
service of interest. Allen and Loomis (2006), for example, use predator-prey models to estimate 
indirect values for species that serve to support the production of something for which society has 
a direct value. However, such parameterized production functions are still scarce in the ecology 
literature. 
In order to highlight the possible features of optimal conservation policy, I first focus on 
the case where a benevolent social planner has control over all the money in the economy, I. The 
planner can allocate that money between funds to protect charismatic species, b, funds to protect 
non-charismatic species, n, and funds available to spend on ordinary consumer goods, X. We can 
normalize price Px to be equal to one. Also, since b and n are funds of money to be spent on 
conservation, there are no prices associated them.
2 The aggregate social welfare function is 
increasing in B, S, and X. Thus, the social planner solves the following constrained optimization 
problem:    7
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The solution to this problem depends critically on the form of the utility function. I first 
present an extended set of results where the utility function is a simple Cobb-Douglas form. I then 




Under this assumption, we have  
(,, )
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In order to simplify notation, define the following: 
() , , bb b SB nb n S b nX KK K K K γ δα α γδα α ≡+ ≡ = + +    (5) 
By substituting the production functions from equations (1) and (2) into the utility function in 
equation (4), carrying out a monotonic transformation on the result, and employing the 
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This problem again has the standard Cobb-Douglas form and the exponents on the choice 
variables b, n, and X sum to one. Note that social preferences over funds allocated to these three 
categories are a function of both preferences over goods and the production functions that 
produce environmental goods from the funds dedicated to them. If we consider the first 
expression in equation (5), for example,  () bb b SB K γ δα α ≡ + , the relative weight in social 
preferences given to funds for charismatic species depends on several things: how effectively 
those funds can be converted into increased B populations, how much the B species contributes to 
production of ecosystem services, and how much people value both charismatic species and 
ecosystem services. In contrast, the relative weight in social preferences given to funds for non -
charismatic species is much simpler.  The term nb n S K γ δα ≡ is a function only of how effectively   8
funds for protecting such species are converted into ecosystem services, and how much people 
value those services.  
The solution to this constrained maximization problem is the usual Cobb-Douglas result: 
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Thus, it is highly unlikely that society should spend equal amounts of money on 
conserving both types of species. If the intrinsic value of the charismatic species is very high, 
then ** bn > may obtain. If the value of the ecosystem service is high and the non-charismatic 
species is a critical input to production of that service, then  ** nb > . If, however, the non-
charismatic species makes only minor contributions to ecosystem functioning, optimal spending 
levels on that species are likely to be low in the absence of public preferences for its existence. In 
the presence of strong increasing returns to scale in the production of species populations from 
funding, imbalanced optimal levels of funding imply very large differences in the optimal 
populations of the two species.   
The ESA is not written to solve the problem outlined above. It was written decades 
before the modern focus on ecosystem services, and takes species as its unit of concern. If we 
assume that the Act is administered in a manner consistent with its authorizing language, then we 
are providing equal protection to all species. One interpretation of that condition is that spending 
is constrained such that nb = .
4 If we define znb = = , then the optimization problem in 
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Expenditures on ordinary consumer goods, X, are unchanged in the second-best outcome 
associated with the ESA constraint; features of Cobb-Douglas utility mean that inefficiency in the 
realm of conservation does not shift social spending away from conservation and more deeply 
into consumer goods. The same total amount of money is directed towards environmental 
spending n and b, but each fund receives an amount of money equal to the average of the optimal 
amounts b* and n* given in equation (7). Unless the stars are aligned such that the optimal b* 
happened to be equal to n,* one fund will be too large, the other will be too small, and utility will 
be lower that it could have been. 
In reality, there is no single social planner who controls all the resources in society. 
Rather, the government provides some public goods, and then people in the private sector allocate 
their remaining resources between public and private goods. Private provision can be an 
important component of total conservation funding. Thus, I now model a situation in which both 
agents have a role to play.  
I abstract from several important features of reality in this formal modeling effort. I 
assume that private individuals work as a single decision-making entity to maximize social 
welfare given their limited resources and the actions already taken by the government. In 
particular, the current model assumes there is no free riding among individuals in the private 
sector. The existence of free riding is extremely well known (see List, Bulte and Shogren (2002) 
for a case related to endangered species), and such behavior would be easy to incorporate with a 
parameter that biases total private expenditures away from optimal levels of public good 
provision. However, this added notation would offer little new insight. We will instead have 
further intuitive discussion of the issues associated with free riding in later sections of the paper. 
Similarly, I abstract from issues of inefficiency in the public sector. Much has been written about 
the shadow cost of public funds (e.g. Triest, 1990), and a whole literature exists to evaluate   10
whether the public or private sector makes more efficient use of funds for providing public goods 
(e.g. Grimsey and Lewis, 2005); the function of the current paper, however, is not to stake a claim 
in that debate. 
In this model, the government uses a lump-sum non-distortionary tax to allocate part of 
total social resources, I, to be its budget, T.
5 The government chooses how to allocate that money 
between b
g and n
g (the g superscript indicates government provision of resources) subject to its 
budget constraint and any constraints built into the ESA.  Then the private sector (modeled here 
as a single agent) chooses private b
p , n
p, and X
p to solve 
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The problem is little changed from the government optimization problem in equation (6), 
except the private sector has less money at its disposal and must take government endowments of 
b
g and n
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As long as government expenditure on the environmental funds follows the ratio given in 
equation (8), the private sector will be able to bring society up to the first best outcome given by 
the total amounts of b, n, and X in equation (7). We will simply have 
** * *, *, *
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Even if the ESA constrains government allocations to have b
g = n
g, as long as the 
government budget T is small relative to optimal total spending on environmental goods, the 
private sector will be able to adjust its choices of b
p and n
p as in equation (9) to achieve the 
optimal total expenditure on b, n, and X. If, for example,  ** nb < , private donors would choose 
to devote most of their resources to funds that supplement protection for charismatic species, thus 
mitigating the harm to social welfare that the ESA might have done by inducing egalitarian 
government-mandated protection for all species.   11
However, if government programs are large, there may be no way for the first best 
outcome to be achieved. To see this, we can look at an extreme example where  * TIX =−  (i.e. 
the government budget includes all resources that should optimally be allocated to conservation 
in the first-best outcome),  ** nb  (because  nb KK  ), and the ESA constrains 1
2
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The non-negativity constraint on n
p will then be binding; the private sector might like to take 
some resources away from conservation of species N and re-allocate them, but can not. Thus, the 
best it can do is to set n
p = 0 and solve: 
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Blind solution of this problem yields 
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We observe no private spending on species that contribute to welfare only through 
ecosystem services. Private spending on charismatic species is also low; it can even be equal to 
zero if government spending T is a very large fraction of total resources I and  Xb K α  , though 
that outcome is unlikely. As long as that non-negativity constraint does not bind and 
* 0
p b >  , 
sub-optimal resources are spent on consumer goods, since  
*** () ()
pp X IT b IT X =−− <−=   . 
Overall, there is a negative correlation between the size of the government conservation program 
and private donations to conservation funds. Excess total social resources are spent on the non-
charismatic species, too few total resources are likely to be devoted to both charismatic species 
and consumer goods, and social welfare is lower than it would be in the absence of the ESA 
policy constraint.  
 
Quasi-linear preferences: 
Cobb-Douglas utility is widely used in applied work. However, it imposes symmetry on   12
preferences that may be unrealistic; the marginal utility of consumer goods depends on the 
quantity of charismatic species just as does the marginal utility of environmental services. This 
section uses a graphical, intuitive approach to explore the impact of ESA restrictions on 
conservation outcomes when the social welfare function is instead quasi-linear. In that case, the 
social planner solves: 
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Quasi-linear preferences are also widely used in economic models. The consumer good X 
acts as a numeraire, and the marginal utilities of the conservation goods are unrelated to the 
quantity of the private consumer good (and vice versa). The solution to the problem in equation 
(10) is subject to corner solutions. Figure 1 shows the indirect utility function when all resources I 
are devoted to b and n and X = 0, Vbn(I), and the indirect utility function associated with X = I, 
VX(I). If the marginal utility of money devoted to b and n is diminishing
6 as shown in the figure, 
the planner will allocate all resources to b and n until the level of income I0 at which the marginal 
utility of money spent on conservation goods is equal to one (which is the marginal utility of 
money spent on X). At that point, spending on b and n will not increase further with I; rather, all 
additional I will be spent on X:  0 * X II = − . 
If the ESA requires b = n, overall social welfare will be lower than when the planner is 
free to allocate conservation funds optimally between b and n. Money spent on conservation 
funds can not be allocated optimally between the two funds. This will lower the indirect utility 
function as shown in Figure 1; a given amount of income spent on b and n will yield lower utility 
under the ESA restriction. Thus, the social planner will spend less money in total on b and n, and 
more money on consumer goods:  
**
0
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In contrast to the case with Cobb-Douglas preferences, a social-planner without 
legislative mandates regarding the absolute levels of expenditures on b and n responds to the   13
requirement that species receive equal treatment by shifting resources away from conservation 
and into consumer goods.  
The harm done by the ESA mandate for equity might be mitigated if there is a private 
sector, and the government has only  0 TI < available to spend on ESA-related conservation. It is 
possible that the private sector can allocate its budget, I-T, such that 
* *
pg nnn +=and 
* *
pg bb b =− so that it makes sense to choose  *
0 *
p XX I I = =−, and the first-best solution is 
achieved. However, if the government allocation is highly skewed from the optimal ratio and 
government expenditures are large, then (as in the Cobb-Douglas case) private donors will be 
unable to use their budget to fully remedy the mis-allocation, and (unlike with Cobb-Douglas 
preferences) total social resources will be skewed towards consumer goods X at the expense of 
conservation. 
 
Empirical Exploration of Public/Private Conservation Efforts 
The model developed in Section II indicates that optimal aggregate private contributions to 
wildlife conservation funds is likely to vary negatively with the size of the government’s ESA 
program. The enforcement agency might implicitly allocate social conservation resources among 
species in exactly the way that society prefers. Metrick and Weitzman (1996) find that 
charismatic mega-fauna are more likely to be listed under the Act. Ando (1999) finds that species 
move more quickly towards being listed if they are strongly supported by public comments, and 
move more slowly toward the list if they face public opposition and/or are in conflict with 
economic activity. Furthermore, Ando (2001) finds evidence that conservation supporters lobby 
more heavily for species to be listed in areas where few species have already been listed, 
indicating that much of the pressure for listings comes from environmentalists’ desire to protect 
the ecosystems in which species live. If government resources for conservation are allocated 
efficiently among species, the model in this paper indicates that we would see a simple negative   14
relationship between government conservation and private conservation donations, as the private 
sector merely serves to fill in whatever gap exists between the optimal level of protection funds 
and the resources mobilized by the government. 
There might be an even stronger negative relationship between private donations and 
ESA enforcement if the government takes a literal interpretation of the ESA and truly mandates 
that equal social resources be spent protecting all endangered species. Then if the government 
program is large relative to the total amount that society wants to spend on conservation, 
increased ESA enforcement might squelch private contributions to all conservation programs, as 
potential donors feel their appetite for conservation has been exhausted and find the marginal 
utility of money spent on such programs to be greatly diminished by misallocation among 
species. This finding is most likely if social preferences are strongly separable between 
conservation goods and consumer goods.  
Thus, the model predicts that second-best aggregate private contributions to conservation 
would decrease if ESA enforcement increased. However, the free-riding that was finessed in the 
model is likely to be an important part of reality. Actual aggregate private contributions to 
conservation are likely to be smaller than the second-best levels. Furthermore, Andreoni (1998) 
shows that in the presence of increasing returns to scale, government provision of a public good 
can act to increase private provision by increasing the marginal returns of private spending and 
eliminating low levels of private giving as a Nash equilibrium. Hence, if free-riding is a big 
problem and private donors are aware of the increasing returns in producing wildlife populations, 
we could see a positive correlation between actual private donations to wildlife groups and the 
level of ESA enforcement.  
This section of the paper conducts a simple empirical exploration to evaluate the nature 
of the relationship between ESA enforcement and actual private contributions to conservation 
groups. Currently the data set is quite limited in scope, but the results of even this limited exercise 
are provocative.    15
 
Data 
I gathered data on contributions to private organizations that work to protect endangered species, 
other environmental groups, and charities that focus on non-environmental public good (such as 
remediation of homelessness and hunger). The list of organizations in the data set is given in table 
1, with the NGOs grouped by category. I assigned groups to categories by reading descriptions of 
the groups’ activities, and by inspecting the NTEE designations chosen by the groups to represent 
themselves.
7  
There are 11 groups in the “Wildlife” category, including Defenders of Wildlife, 
Conservation International, and the World Wildlife Fund. These groups focus on conservation 
efforts that benefit wildlife, and typically contribute to efforts to protect endangered species that 
are particularly highly valued (e.g. waterfowl valued by hunters, tigers, and pandas.) Another 14 
groups are in the “Single Species” category. These groups, including Bat Conservation 
International and the Wolf Conservation Foundation, and the Jane Goodall Institute, are highly 
focused on a single species (or set of species) of threatened plants or animals. They also tend to 
be smaller than the groups in the “Wildlife” category, and hence may find their total donations 
are more susceptible to random fluctuations. 
One could carry out a regression to see how donations to these groups varies with ESA 
enforcement, but it would be difficult to know whether unobservable changes in other policies 
(such as tax treatment of charitable donations) that are correlated with ESA enforcement might 
really be driving any changes in donations. Thus, I also use information on non-profits in slightly 
different categories. The ten organizations in the “Environment” group include the Environmental 
Defense Fund and the Sierra Club. They work to provide environmental public goods that are not 
necessarily related to endangered species. Finally, there are nine groups in a “Human” category, 
including the American Red Cross, America’s Second Harvest, and Doctors without Borders, 
which are focused on humanitarian public goods that have nothing to do with the environment.   16
 
Information on public donations is available in the IRS Form 990 that non-profit organizations 
must file if their income exceeds a minimum threshold. I counted the sum of lines 1a (“Direct 
public support”) and 3 (“Membership dues and assessments”) as total private contributions
8. I 
used forms from 1995 to 2006 available online from the GuideStar
9 service, a database of IRS 
recognized non-profit organizations. Non-profit Form 990s must be made publicly available for 
the most recent three years, but non-profits are under no obligation to make older forms available. 
Thus, forms were not available for all organizations for all years.  
Some effort was needed to generate estimates of calendar-year contributions. 
Organizations vary widely in the set of months over which they reported activities in the Form 
990s. Some reported for calendar years, but many reported for fiscal years that started in some 
intermediate month (ranging from April to October). I carefully estimate calendar-year 
contributions as weighted averages of contributions from reported fiscal years that overlap with 
the calendar year. Finally, I use the Consumer Price Index to normalize donations to 2006 dollars.  
Table 2 gives some summary statistics on donations to groups (an observation is total 
donations to a single group in a given calendar year.) Wildlife groups in this sample do not attract 
as much funding as broader environmental groups or the big non-profits in this sample devoted to 
improving human food security and well-being. This may be due in part to the fact that I gathered 
data on fairly small organizations devoted to single species; however, even the most well funded 
wildlife group does not garner as much money as the largest general environmental group,  
One could devise various proxies for the intensity of ESA enforcement, and hence the 
amount of social resources being spent on endangered species under the auspices of the ESA. 
Most of the costs of the ESA are opportunity costs associated with things like foregone 
development, timber not harvested, and water not diverted or pumped for human use (for 
examples of studies related to these costs, see Zabel and Paterson (2006), Waters et al. (1994), 
Huppert (1999), and Rucker et al. (2005)). Direct costs associated with programs such as captive   17
breeding are only a very small tip of that iceberg. Total resources spent on endangered-species 
conservation are not observable to the donating public any more than to the present researcher. 
Thus, I considered proxies for ESA-associated conservation expenditures that would be visible to 
the general public. It is surprisingly difficult to find data on annual budget allocations for the 
particular program within the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) that administers the ESA
10. 
Hence, I decided to use the number of new endangered-species listings
11 each year as a proxy for 
ESA activity.  
Endangered-species listings are a very public part of the administration of the Act. Many 
listings emerge from petitions made by people outside the government (environmental groups, 
scientists, etc.) and members of the public seem to be aware of trends in listing activity. There 
were, for example, temporary moratoriums on new listings declared in 1995 and 2001 that 
provoked cries of outrage from environmental groups. As Figure 3 makes clear, however, 2001 
was a productive year for listings in comparison to the years that have followed it. 
 
Results 
In the empirical exercise, I use panel data methods to explore whether there is a positive or 
negative correlation between donations to wildlife NGOs and government enforcement of the 
ESA.  
0i 1 2 3 + # it t t t it Donations listings BushInOffice Moratorium β ββ β ε =+ + +        (12) 
The first variable is the number of listings in that year. This is the main variable to proxy 
for intensity of ESA-related conservation expenditure. The second variable is a dummy for 
whether George W. Bush was president in that year; the alternative category is William J. 
Clinton. I include this dummy in case there are features of the Bush administration that altered 
conservation donation behavior independent of ESA listings. The last variable is a dummy for the 
year 2001 in which
12 a moratorium on listings was attempted (though later lifted). I include this to   18
allow the threatened moratorium to influence contribution behavior differently from the number 
of listings that were eventually made that year. 
I estimate this simple equation using fixed-effects estimators
13 to control for 
organization-specific factors (such as year founded, size, and reputation for effectiveness) that are 
likely to affect the average annual level of giving to each group. I estimate the regression on three 
samples: the whole sample, a subsample containing just the wildlife-oriented groups (those like 
the WWF and those focused on a single species), and a subsample containing all groups except 
those oriented toward wildlife.
14 The results are found in table 3. 
When the regression is run on the subsample of wildlife groups, we see that endangered 
species listings are significantly positively correlated with the amount of money people give to 
such groups. Nearly half the variance in the dependent variable is due to difference in the 
organization-specific fixed effects, but the F-statistic for the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables is highly significant – intertemporal variation correlated with species listings is 
important. The point estimate of the coefficient on the number of species listed indicates that one 
additional listing is associated with an increase in donations to a given wildlife group of 
$800,000. This is modest compared to the average annual donations to such groups of over $18 
million, but the difference in annual listings from the high of 94 in 1996 to the low of 2 in 2003 
would be associated with an expected drop in the average annual donation to a representative 
wildlife group of over $75 million. Neither the change to the Bush administration from Clinton 
nor the threatened moratorium on listings has an additional impact on donations to wildlife 
groups.  
We might be concerned that the result is completely spurious, and endangered species 
listings are just correlated with other time-varying factors that influence contributions to non-
profit organizations, such as changes in consumer confidence, unemployment rates, and tax 
incentives for charitable giving. If this were the case, we might expect to see similar results in the 
regression of donations to other groups (not focused on wildlife) on endangered-species listings.   19
As we see from the middle column of table 3, there is no significant correlation between listings 
and donations in the regression on non-wildlife focused groups. In the right-hand column, we see 
that the effect on wildlife groups does not dominate the results when the whole sample is 
included; nothing is significant in that regression. This supports the idea that there is a meaningful 
positive correlation between ESA enforcement and donations to groups to work to protect 
endangered species.  
 
Conclusions 
The ESA clearly fails to provide ecosystem services when the species that provide them happen 
to be widespread enough not to be endangered. Society has begun to fill this gap with a small 
number of efforts that are targeted at ecosystems more broadly; policies such as the Wetlands 
Reserve Program protect ecosystem services associated with wetlands, and a growing slate of 
local initiatives have sought to purchase open space around cities to protect other services 
associated with having such lands remain undisturbed. However, there remain many parts of the 
country where ecosystem services are inefficiently low, and no policy exists to remedy the market 
failures at hand. 
The ESA is also unlikely to yield optimal conservation levels even of endangered species. 
This paper shows that social welfare is unlikely to be maximized by a policy like the ESA that 
requires equal protection for all listed species. Such a policy would yield inefficiently low relative 
support for efforts to protect relatively high valued species. If social preferences are separable 
between conservation and non-conservation goods, that inefficiency could even push excess total 
social resources away from conservation and towards consumer goods. 
I show that private conservation can help to remediate inefficient distribution of 
government activity among species. However, the private sector can not act effectively if the 
government program is so large that it exhausts society’s appetite for conservation, or if 
irreversible commitments to species are made that exceed total social WTP to protect those   20
species. This observation provides support for the notion that it could be wise to keep the scale of 
government programs modest, to leave room for private initiatives to remedy accidental 
government misallocations.  
There is reason to worry, though, that private provision of conservation resources will 
suffer from free-riding and thus be sub-optimally low. Preliminary econometric findings indicate 
there is a positive correlation between ESA enforcement and private donations to groups that 
protect endangered species. That finding is consistent with the hypothesis that there is significant 
free-riding among private donors (and hence under-provision of conservation resources from the 
private sector), and that government conservation acts to seed in private conservation efforts by 
overcoming threshold effects and increasing the marginal returns to private funds.  
The tide of federal politics is currently undergoing a large sea change away from political 
forces that are hostile to conservation policy. This may be an opportune moment to seriously 
reconsider U.S. conservation policy; how could the ESA be usefully reformed? Since society 
gains value from ecosystem services and from the existence of some species, we might consider 
adopting a two-pronged policy that addresses those needs independently.  
As suggested by Loomis and White (1996; p. 205), “Rather than the current approach of 
valuing individual species, which misses both ecological complementarity among species… and 
substitution effects…, a habitat-based evaluation is likely to be more useful.” We could have a 
policy that identifies places where ecosystem services are declining, and mobilizes resources to 
promote the recovery of such services even if no particular species in the area are in danger of 
extinction. Such a law would still be subject to the conflicts between winners and losers that 
plague the current ESA, but the transaction costs would be greatly reduced by not fighting 
separate battles for all individual species involved. Furthermore, policy makers could take the 
opportunity to incorporate many of lessons we have learned from the ESA about providing 
incentives for private economic agents directly into the law (Innes et al., 1998; Langpap, 2006; 
Polasky et al, 1996).   21
To complement such an “Endangered Ecosystem Service Act,” we could continue to 
have a reformed Endangered Species Act that would serve to protect the species that society 
values for their own existence, without being shackled with the burden of also protecting species 
that are valued only for the role they play in providing ecosystem services. We do have some 
policies that have sought to address the ESA’s inability to direct adequate resources toward 
protecting popular charismatic species; the African Elephant Conservation Act and the 
Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Acts are the most prominent examples. However, current 
efforts are likely to be inadequate because they do not cover enough charismatic species, and it 
seems highly inefficient to have to pass a new law every time a species has broad support for 
increased conservation efforts. A reformed Endangered Species Act could provide government 
funds to match private conservation funds aimed at conservation of charismatic endangered 
species. This would mitigate the free-rider problem in private conservation, while letting revealed 
public preferences guide government expenditures on species-specific conservation activity.  
The ESA has helped to hold the line against excessive rates of land development, timber 
harvesting, and water diversion in many parts of the U.S. However, it was written without the 
benefit of our current understanding of the relationships between endangered species, 
biodiversity, and ecosystem services. Endangered species, ecosystems, and society might all well 
fare better if policy makers, biologists, and economists work together to reform the law. 
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Vbn(I)     is the indirect utility function when all income is spent on b and n. 
 
Vbn(I) – ESA   is the indirect utility function when all income is spent on b and n, but the ESA 
requires b=n. 
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Table 1. Organizations in Data Set, by Category 
 
Organization Name  Category  Year Founded 
African Wildlife Foundation  Wildlife  1961 
Biodiversity Conservation Alliance  Wildlife  1988 
Conservation International  Wildlife  1987 
Defenders of Wildlife  Wildlife  1947 
Ducks Unlimited  Wildlife  1937 
Massachusetts Audubon  Wildlife  1896 
National Coalition for Marine Conservation Wildlife  1973 
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation  Wildlife  1984 
National Wildlife Federation  Wildlife  1936 
Wildlife Conservation Society  Wildlife  1895 
World Wildlife Fund  Wildlife  1961 
Bat Conservation International  Single Species  1982 
Bonobo Conservation Initiative  Single Species  1998 
CCC Sea turtles  Single Species  1959 
Center for Plant Conservation  Single Species  1984 
Cheetah Conservation Fund  Single Species  2000 
International Crane Foundation  Single Species  1979 
Jane Goodall Institute  Single Species  1977 
Lemur Conservation Foundation  Single Species  1996 
Owens Foundation  Single Species  1986 
Peregrine Fund  Single Species  1970 
Pheasants Forever  Single Species  1982 
Save the Redwoods League  Single Species  1918 
Trout Unlimited  Single Species  1959 
Wolf Conservation Center  Single Species  1999 
American Rivers  Other Environment 1973 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation  Other Environment 1966 
Environmental Defense Fund  Other Environment 1967 
Natural Resources Defense Council  Other Environment 1970 
Sierra Club  Other Environment 1960 
World Resources Institute  Other Environment 1982 
National Audubon Society, Inc  Other Environment 1972 
Nature Conservancy  Other Environment 1951 
The Conservation Fund  Other Environment 1985 
Trust for Public Land  Other Environment 1972 
American Red Cross  Human  1881 
America's Second Harvest  Human  1979 
Amnesty International  Human  1961 
Doctors Without Borders  Human  1971 
National Coalition for the Homeless  Human  1984 
OXFAM – America  Human  1970 
Southern Poverty Law Center  Human  1971 
UNICEF  Human  1947 
United Way of America  Human  1932   29
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Donations to Non-Profits 
 
  Type of Organizations 
  Wildlife Other Environment Human  Whole Sample 
# Observations  187   79  73 339 
Mean donations  246 908  2420 868 
Minimum donations      .58 47  2 .58 
Maximum donations  5233 6017  25713 25713 
Standard deviation of donations  592 1456  4747 2493 
 
Note: Annual donations to a given group are expressed in $100,000 
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Table 3. Regression Results 
 































Fraction of variance due to fixed effects 
 
.45 .51  .53 
F Statistic 
 
3.14*** 1.46  1.23 
# Observations in sample 
 
187 152  339 
# Organizations in sample 
 
25 19  44 
 
Note:   Standard errors in parentheses 
 
  *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level; 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Note that ecosystem services include intangibles such as moral and cultural values, and 
need not be limited to practical things such as flood control and food production. 
2 The current version of this paper does not study policies that change the relative prices 
of any of these goods, so there is little to be gained by carrying price notation around in 
the equations. 
3 I obtain qualitatively similar results when I use a utility function that is less symmetric 
than Cobb-Douglas: US B X S B =+ , a member of a family of functions put forth by 
Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) to handle problems when public goods are important. In 
ordinary consumer choice problems, this function yields demand functions that display 
less symmetry in cross-price effects than does Cobb-Douglas. However, the general 
findings of my model are not changed by using this function instead of the Cobb-
Douglas. 
4 Another interpretation of the ESA constraint might be to insist that all species have 
populations in excess of some minimum value; future versions of this work will explore 
that alternative formulation. 
5 I do not model that choice, but rather take the quantity T as exogenously chosen. The 
optimal value of T depends on the tradeoffs between free-riding in the private sector and 
inefficiency in the public sector. 
6 Note that if u(S,B) is Cobb-Douglas, the marginal utility of money spend on b and n is 
constant, and so there will be a single corner solution to the optimization problem; either 
all money is always spent on conservation goods, or all money is always spent on X. I 
consider a more interesting general set of sub-utility functions in this discussion. 
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7 The National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) Classification System was 
developed by The National Center for Charitable Statistics. 
8 I include membership dues in the total because many people donate to big organizations 
such as the Sierra Club only in the form of purchasing membership, but still feel they are 
supporting the organizations activities without additional donation. 
9 See http://www.guidestar.org/.  
10 The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration is responsible for a 
small part of ESA administration, but the FWS really presides over most such activity. 
11 Future versions of this work may also use data on critical habitat designations (present 
for 484 out of 1285 U.S. species on the list, habitat conservation plan approval (there are 
695 currently in place), and/or recovery plan approval (complete for 1071 species.) 
12 To be precise, the moratorium was announced in October 2000; I expect the effects on 
donations to appear in the following calendar year. 
13 The results are qualitatively similar when the random-effects model is used. 
14 I would like to estimate the regression on a sub-sample including “Other Environment” 
groups only, but there are relatively few such groups in my sample and group-level fixed 
effects currently dominates the results of such a regression completely. More data would 
need to be collected to make this possible. 